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COMMENTARY
MUNICIPAL RIPOFF: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF CABLE
TELEVISION FRANCHISE FEES
AND ACCESS SUPPORT
PAYMENTS
David J. Saylor *

I.

AN INTRODUCTORY PARADE OF HORRIBLES

Imagine the outcry if the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
announced that henceforth all television and radio licenses would be auctioned off to the highest bidder for each license term. The political justification for such a development could be quite straightforward: Uncle Sam
needs the money to help reduce the national debt and save government programs from the clutches of Gramm-Rudman.' The purported legal rationale for this radical departure from current practice would be that the public,
i.e., the federal government, owns the air space and is entitled to get fair
market value for renting the airwaves to broadcasters.
Or, consider this frightening scenario. Suppose the mayor and city council of Washington, D.C. were to give the Washington Post an ultimatum:
pay five percent of the Post's gross revenues into the city coffers. If you
don't pay up, your vending machines on public sidewalks will be impounded, your delivery trucks will be ticketed, your newsboys arrested if
they dare to use the public rights-of-way, and your reporters will be kicked
out of city hall.
And how about these possibilities? Suppose the mayor of Philadelphia,
anxious to improve his image, required the PhiladelphiaInquirerto deliver a
copy of his "Weekly Report to the Citizens" to each of the Inquirer'ssubscribers as a condition of the Inquirer'saccess to public property and rights*

Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C. A.B. 1967, Williams College; J.D.

1970, Harvard University.
1. 'Public Debt Limit-Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of December 12, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037.
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of-way. And, what if he also required the Inquirer to buy him the word
processing and photocopying equipment needed for production of his
"Weekly Report"? Or, what if the Los Angeles city fathers conditioned the
local subscription television broadcaster's business license (or its salesmen's
and antenna installers' use of the public rights-of-way) on its providing free
service to the schools, libraries, and fire department and one-half hour of air
time per week for each councilman's public service address?

II.

THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM

The foregoing scenarios would provoke such protest from constitutional
scholars, media spokesmen, and the public that they may seem fanciful.
But, as applied to cable television, they are par for the course. Until very
recently, cable operators have been passive punching bags for municipal
pugilists. In order to offer their programming in municipalities, cable operators have had to participate in auctions to balance local budgets. They have
been forced to disgorge five percent (and sometimes more) of their gross
revenues in the form of "franchise fees" just so they could place their cables
in aerial and underground locations alongside gas, electric, telephone, and
other utility lines that have paid the same municipalities little or nothing.
Cable operators have even given city councils absolute programming control
over certain cable channels. Such operators have been forced to finance the
construction of municipally controlled television studios, to deliver free production equipment to city officials and institutions, and to provide free installation and program service to schools and other city designees. Cable
companies have been required, without reimbursement, to train and equip
amateur programmers whose frequently low-quality, mandatorily carried
programming may cause the operators to lose subscribers. Even when such
programming is of high quality it diverts subscribers from the operators'
revenue-earning services. Unless paid as "franchise fees," the foregoing cash
and in-kind obligations are generally referred to as "support" for public,
educational, or governmental (PEG) access programming. The list of such
obligations goes on, reflecting the remarkable ingenuity of cities and their
consultants in devising schemes for financing pet "public interest" projects
out of cable companies' and subscribers' money.
This Commentary explains why the cities' imposition of franchise fee and
related cash and in-kind payment requirements violates the free speech, free
press, and equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution.
The subject is timely and not without its strong advocates on both sides. In
1985 cable companies filed two federal lawsuits2 and at least one state court
2. Erie Telecommunications, Inc. v. City of Erie, No. 85-185 (W.D. Pa. filed July 16,
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counterclaim 3 raising these constitutional issues.
The curious reader may wonder why these constitutional issues were not
litigated and decided years ago during the first several decades of cable television. After all, franchise fees are not a new requirement; they date back
twenty years or more. Access programming support payments, equipment
and studio grants, and free service to city-designated recipients were all in
evidence by the mid-1970's. Yet not until the cabling of the largest urban
and suburban communities in the late 1970's and early 1980's did the municipal appetite for franchise fees and access support payments grow to its current gargantuan proportions.
The cable industry might blame some of its own propagandists, in part,
for the situation. Cable salesmen and "wired nation" visionaries surely contributed to the views of mayors and councilmen. And the latter often viewed
cable television as a panacea for municipal financial ills, a laboratory for
latent local creative talent, and the answer to the incumbent politician's
dream that he be seen frequently in video.
But the real reason why cable companies did not challenge the cities was
quite simple. No cable franchise applicant could even question the constitutionality of franchise fees without automatically forfeiting its chance to win
the franchise. By suing one franchise authority, a company would have
guaranteed itself a prominent position on the equivalent of a national blacklist, effectively ending its franchise hopes in other jurisdictions.4 Until the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act)5 accorded cable
franchisees a reasonable renewal expectancy, an incumbent operator would
have risked almost certain nonrenewal by challenging franchise fee and support payment requirements. Ironically, that very Cable Act-compromise
1985); Tribune Co. Cable v. City of Lakewood, No. CV-85-2721-AAH(Ix) (C.D. Cal. filed
Apr. 24, 1985). As counsel for the plaintiff cable companies in these cases, the author admits

to a professional bias. Inasmuch as this area of law is evolving rapidly and the facts are still
emerging in those cases, however, nothing said in this article is in any way binding on the
plaintiffs or their counsel in those cases.

The author is indebted to his colleagues Steven J. Horvitz and Robert L. Corn, associates at
Hogan & Hartson, for their work on these two cases. Certainly, their thoughts and research
have influenced the direction and substance of this article; but, of course, any misjudgments

are the writer's own. The author also acknowledges his debt to the seminal work in the field,
G.

SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND, & J. MERCURIO, "CABLESPEECH":
AMENDMENT PROTECTION (1983).

THE CASE

FOR FIRST

3. City of Sheboygan v. Lakeside Cablevision, No. 85-CV-306 (Cir. Ct., Sheboygan Co.,
Wis., answer and counterclaim filed May 30, 1985).
4. The typical request for proposals (RFP) requires the applicant to disclose any cable

litigation with other municipalities.
5. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559). See 47 U.S.C.A. § 546 (West Supp. 1985) (pertaining to
renewals).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 35:671

legislation that was vigorously supported by some elements of the cable industry-seemingly legitimized five-percent franchise fees and most access
support payments.6
III.

CABLE TELEVISION OPERATOR AS A FIRST AMENDMENT SPEAKER

There was a time when the cable television operator was considered not a
speaker but solely a distributor of other persons' speech. That day has long

passed. At first, cable operators provided only community antenna television (CATV) service, which was just what the name implied. The operator
placed an antenna on the community's highest building or hill and by coaxial cable brought in improved reception of all the local off-air broadcast stations. Provided that the cable had enough electronic capacity, the operator
made no signal selection; all stations received were carried. Eventually,
however, regionally popular distant stations began to be microwaved to the
cable system. The additional signal choices made available by microwave
technology presented the cable operator with quasi-editorial opportunities.
Cable operators also began to cablecast movies from films or tapes licensed
by the studios and delivered through the mail.
Satellite technology spawned the greatest wealth of program diversity
available to cable: broadcast "superstations," premium pay services, and advertiser-supported nonbroadcast networks. The FCC's must-carry,7 distant
signal,' sports blackout,9 syndicated exclusivity, 0 and network nonduplica6. 47 U.S.C.A. § 542(b) (West Supp. 1985) permits franchise fees up to 5%. 47
U.S.C.A. § 542(g)(2) (West Supp. 1985) excludes from the definition of "franchise fee" (and
therefore from the 5% ceiling) certain payments for support of public, educational, or governmental (PEG) access. In the case of any franchise in existence on the date of enactment,
October 30, 1984, PEG programming and facilities payments are excluded from the definition
of "franchise fee." Id. For franchises granted after October 30, 1984, only PEG "capital
costs" are excluded. Id. PEG support provisions in effect on the Act's effective date, December 29, 1984, are grandfathered. 47 U.S.C.A. § 557(a) (West Supp. 1985). 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 542(g)(2)(d) (West Supp. 1985) excludes from the definition of "franchise fee" and the 5%
limit "requirements or charges incidental to the awarding or enforcing of the franchise."
The retroactive effect vel non of these sections of the Cable Act, as applied to payments
made under franchise provisions that were declared or would have been declared unlawful by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) under the law as it existed prior to October
30 or December 29, 1984, remains an open question. The Cable Act took effect "60 days after
the date of enactment," i.e., on December 30, 1984, "[elxcept where otherwise expressly provided" in the Act. 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (West Supp. 1985). One court, however, has declined to
treat the Cable Act's franchise fee provisions as prospective only and has denied a cable operator's post-Cable Act request for restitution of franchise fees paid pre-Act in excess of FCC
limits. Village of Beverly Hills v. Booth Communications, No. 85-291948 CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Oakland Co. Sept. 10, 1985).
7. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.55, 76.57, 76.59, 76.61, 76.64, 76.65 (1985).
8. Id. §§ 76.57, 76.59, 76.61, 76.65 (1980).
9. Id. § 76.67 (1985).
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tion" rules, and the Copyright Act's compulsory royalty fees" z restricted the
cable operator's freedom to choose among various broadcast signals, but
some journalistic discretion remained. In the realm of nonbroadcast
services, both pay- and advertiser-supported, the cable operator's opportunities for editorial selection expanded dramatically. In addition to selecting or
rejecting a service entirely, the operator retained much freedom to package
several services together or to tier them at different price levels. With the
demise of the FCC's distant signal and must-carry rules,I3 the cable operator
acquired still greater freedom of choice even though it remained subject to
compulsory copyright license constraints. Many cable systems today originate their own local news, public affairs, and sports programming. Some
systems also sell advertising time on their origination channels, and even
more are selling time allotted to them by the nonbroadcast advertiser-supported networks.
Whether or not a cable operator today actually produces programming in
its own studio or sells advertising time, all cable operators truly have become
electronic editors and journalists. The fact that a cable operator may simply
select and retransmit other persons' creative efforts does not make the cable
operator any less a first amendment speaker. Readers' Digest is fully protected by the first amendment even though it selects and republishes works
that first appeared in other publications. Small town newspapers are fully
protected by the first amendment even though many of their columns and
features are taken directly from the Associated Press or United Press International wires and from the syndicated services of far larger newspapers.
Book and magazine stores are protected first amendment speakers even if
their proprietors have not authored a single book or article sold in their
stores. "Whether or not [the cable operator] produces any original programming of its own, its activities of transmitting and packaging programming
mandate that it receive First Amendment protection."' 4
The courts have confirmed cable's status as a first amendment speaker.'"
10. Id. §§ 76.151, 76.153, 76.155, 76.157, 76.159, 76.161 (1980).
11. Id. §§ 76.92, 76.94, 76.95, 76.97, 76.99 (1985).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982).
13. Malrite TV v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982);

Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
14. Tele-Communications, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330, 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
15. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed sub nom. National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 54
U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1986) (No. 85-502); Tele-Communications, Inc. v. United States,
757 F.2d 1330, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Preferred
Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 380 (1985); Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052-57 (8th Cir. 1978), afJ'd on
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Cable television, however, is a medium of expression somewhat different
from others. The question remains whether the courts will accord cable operators the same rights as those granted to newspaper or magazine publishers, somewhat lesser rights analogous to those of broadcasters, or some
hybrid of the rights of both.
IV.

THE MUNICIPALITIES' ARGUMENT:

POSSIBLE RATIONALES

There are six possible rationales that a city might offer in defense of its
franchise fee and PEG access support requirements:' 6
(1) Some politicians candidly preach that any time a city has the opportunity to raise revenues by means other than conventional taxes it would be
almost criminal not to do so. Advocates of this view see cable TV as simply
another contract service performed for the city. If the ambulance, taxi, or
refuse company must pay the city a portion of the company's gross revenues
for the valuable privilege of doing business there, why should the cable operitor be any different? This can be called the "revenue-raising" rationale in
its purest form.
(2) Municipal officials may also look at cable TV from a landlord's perspective. The streets and sidewalks, and the aerial and subterranean property adjacent thereto, have been dedicated to public use and subjected to city
control. The city ultimately is responsible for the care and policing of the
public rights of way. Because it exercises authority akin to that of a private
landlord, is it not reasonable for the city to charge the cable operator fair
market rent for cable's specialized use of aerial and subterranean property?
This is the "rent" rationale.
(3) Politicians with an amateur economic bent often stress the de facto
exclusivity of most cable franchises. By exercising its police powers, the city
has created and preserved the cable system's most valuable asset-its
uniqueness. In return for insulating the cable franchisee from a direct competitive "overbuild,"' 7 has not the city earned a share of the franchisee's
other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-45 (D.C.

Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
16. A seventh rationale is waiver or estoppel. Cities typically argue that cable operators
which sign franchise agreements committing them to make certain franchise fee and access
support payments are "estopped" from later contending that the payment requirements are
illegal. They are deemed to have "waived" their rights. The estoppel and waiver arguments

are offered usually as an affirmative defense rather than a constitutional justification. To treat
them in the constitutional context would require a separate article. Therefore, they will not be
considered in this Commentary.
17. "Overbuild" is the cable industry's term for head-to-head competition between two or
more cable television operators for the same group of potential subscribers. Sometimes a company may actually "overbuild" the wires of its competitor. Other times, when a city has
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gross? This is the "exclusivity" rationale. It is somewhat akin to the proprietary prospective of the commercial franchisor.
(4) Another view justifies collection of franchise fees and access support
payments as a way of financing diversity on what would otherwise be a de
facto or "natural" monopoly medium. Advocates of this view would spend
a portion of the cable operator's gross (as well as additional cash and in-kind
payments) to create diverse programming on PEG access channels. The typical city cannot afford to build and operate its own cable facility. Nor can
school districts, colleges, fire and police departments, libraries, or public service and minority groups afford to create their own cable systems or even
pay commercial leasing rates for cable channels. To maximize speaker diversity, is it not in the public interest to require the cable operator to contribute financially to others' ability to speak? This is the "diversity" rationale.
(5) A variation on the preceding rationale is the view that the cable operator actually profits from the presence of city council meetings, instructional
programs, and amateur productions on its PEG channels. In other words,
but for the PEG programming, some persons would not subscribe to cable at
all. This is the "benefit" rationale.
(6) One final viewpoint is simply that cable operators should reimburse
cities for all the regulatory costs attributable to cable. If a municipality hires
a consultant to select a franchisee, deploys inspectors to ensure the safe construction of cable lines, dispatches policemen to contend with cable-caused
traffic problems, or fields consumer complaints about shoddy service, should
not the cable operator make the municipality financially whole? This is the
"regulatory cost" rationale. It is the only rationale to pass constitutional
muster, as explained below. But even this rationale is subject to abuse and
requires close judicial scrutiny to prevent cities from cross-subsidizing their
other functions with cable television regulatory fees.
V.

FREE SPEECH/FREE PRESS GUARANTEES VIOLATED

The first amendment forbids any federal "law. . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press."' 1 8 "[T]he states are precluded from abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press by force of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' 9 And the fourteenth amendment applies to the
actions not only of the states, but also of the municipalities within those
franchised two companies simultaneously, each may race to beat the other to particular streets
or subdivisions but neither actually "overbuilds" the other's wires.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
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states. 2210 That constitutional protection benefits corporations as well as individuals. 2 ' Cable television operators are electronic publishers engaged in
the constitutionally-protected freedom of speech and of the press,2 2 freedoms
that municipalities may not abridge.
Perhaps more than any other decision, Murdock v. Pennsylvania23 illus-

trates why virtually all franchise fee and all PEG support requirements violate the first and fourteenth amendments. In Murdock, the Borough of
Jeannette, Pennsylvania, promulgated an ordinance requiring the registration and licensing of all door-to-door salesmen. The license fee was "not a
nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question." '24 Several Jehovah's Witnesses went door-todoor in Jeannette distributing literature, soliciting purchase of religious
tracts, and playing a phonograph record expounding their religious views.
They were prosecuted for failing to purchase licenses for their activities.
The Supreme Court treated the Murdock case as one in which the freedoms of speech and of the press were as important as the freedom of religion.2 ' The Court overturned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's affirmance
of the Jehovah's Witnesses' convictions. The license fee, the Court said, was
a "tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A
state [or municipality] may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right
granted by the Federal Constitution. .

.

. The power to impose a license

tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of
censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down."' 26 Although the
Jehovah's Witnesses necessarily used the public rights-of-way to do their
soliciting, the Court said that "whether the state has given something for
which it can ask a return . . . is quite irrelevant here. This tax is not a

charge for the enjoyment of a privilege or benefit bestowed by the state. The
privilege exists apart from state authority. It is guaranteed the people by the
Federal Constitution. "27
The typical cable television ordinance is indistinguishable from the ordinance in Murdock in this respect. It "sets aside the residential areas [indeed,
the whole municipality] as a prohibited zone, entry of which is denied [the
20. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 108, 116 (1943).
21. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. at 244.
22. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.

23. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
24. Id. at 113-14 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 108-10.
26. Id. at 113.
27. Id. at 115.
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cable operator] unless the [franchise fee] is paid."2 8 That the municipality
may need the money for general revenue purposes is not a valid defense, any
more than it would have been in Murdock. Nor may the municipality assert
that it is only charging reasonable rent for the use of the public rights-ofway. In the first place, the municipality normally does not "own" the rightsof-way in the sense that it "owns" city hall or central park. Second, those
rights-of-way are already encumbered by utility easements; and, in most instances, the utilities pay no tribute to the municipality. The cable operator
does not need to pay "rent" to the municipality, but only pole attachment
license fees to the utilities. Indeed in some cable systems, the predominant
rights-of-way are backyard easements and are not above or below public
streets, alleys, or sidewalks. But even where the cable system does cross
public ways, Murdock made clear that the use of the municipality's rightsof-way is "irrelevant" in determining the permissibility of the license fee.29
The "exclusivity" rationale fares no better than the "revenue-raising" and
"rent" rationales. Virtually all cable franchises are expressly nonexclusive
and are required to be so under state law. Having reserved to itself the
power to authorize competition without the incumbent operator's consent
and without reducing the incumbent's franchise fee obligations, the municipality can hardly assert that de facto exclusivity is adequate constitutional
justification for franchise fees. Moreover, most cable operators are subject to
vigorous competition, and few possess a municipally created monopoly in an
economically meaningful market. Cable's pay movie fare competes directly
with video cassettes, movie theaters, and the movies offered on network and
independent broadcast stations. In some communities cable movies also
compete with movies transmitted by over-the-air subscription television
(STV) and microwave (MDS). Cable's sports programming competes with
network and independent broadcasters' sports offerings and with live events
themselves. As somewhat interchangeable forms of entertainment, movies
and sports compete with each other and with other live spectacles such as
theater and concerts. Cable's news programming competes with the network, independent, and noncommerical television and radio broadcasters'
news shows available over the air, and with local newspapers and national
newspapers and magazines such as USA Today, The Wall Street Journal,
Time, and Newsweek. In the advertising side of its business, cable is as yet
only a tiny participant in a market dominated by the broadcast and print
media. Municipalities are powerless to grant a cable operator exclusivity in
any of these markets. Furthermore, even if there is no direct competition in
28. Id. at 117.
29. Id. at 115.
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the particular medium, the Supreme Court has not allowed that to justify
municipal intrusion into the putative monopolist's editorial judgments.3 ° It
seems unlikely, therefore, that the Court would allow the absence of direct
cable competition to justify a municipal raid on the cable operator's
treasury.
The Murdock decision did not directly address whether a municipality
might justify its imposition of a license fee upon one first amendment speaker
in order to finance expression by other speakers who otherwise might be
unable to publicize their views. Defenders of access support requirements
and of that portion of franchise fees which exceed the cost of legitimate regulation frequently argue that cable operators should fund the creation of diversity on PEG channels. The Supreme Court examined and rejected a
similar form of government paternalism in Buckley v. Valeo. 3 Buckley involved provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act that restricted the
amount a political candidate and other individuals could spend. Although
the purpose of those provisions was to equalize the comparative opportunities of rich and poor candidates to communicate with the electorate, the
Court struck them down as infringements on the first amendment freedoms
of candidates and their supporters. By requiring a cable operator to make
payments for the support of PEG users, municipalities necessarily restrict
the amount of money a cable operator has available to finance its own freedom of expression. While the ceiling is not imposed directly as in Buckley, it
is imposed in an impermissible economic sense nonetheless.32 Nor is forced
financing of PEG diversity content-neutral even though it is not programspecific. By definition and purpose, PEG programming is supposed to contrast with the views, styles, and interests of the programming cablecast
under the operator's control. Thus, forced access support financing and
PEG channel carriage unconstitutionally compel the cable operator "to associate with speech with which [it] may disagree" and, by definition, which
33
it would not have telecast voluntarily.
The concept of using the first amendment to enhance "the public's" opportunity to hear and to speak is derived from Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v.
FCC.34 In Red Lion, the Supreme Court rejected broadcasters' first amendment challenge to the "personal attack" and "political editorial" corollaries
30. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-56 (1974).
31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. Cf Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (unconstitu-

tional right-of-reply statute imposes printing, composing, and opportunity costs on
newspaper).

33. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 903, 911 (1986).
34. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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of the FCC's "fairness doctrine." The Court said that the right of the public
to receive information and ideas was "paramount,"3 5 although it conflicted
with the broadcaster's desire not to be the required vehicle for communicating certain information or ideas to the public. The same theme was endorsed
by the Court in CBS, Inc. v. FCC,36 which upheld a limited affirmative right
of access by federal candidates to the broadcast media. Additionally, in FCC
v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,3 7 the Court upheld the
FCC's newspaper-broadcast TV crossownership rules as a legitimate means
of enhancing diversity of broadcast programming through forced diversity of
ownership.
Still the Supreme Court has never accepted the proposition that the first
amendment permits the government to restrict broadcasters' freedom of expression by according the government (or a broad class or classes of government-designated speakers) mandatory access to the airwaves. In Columbia
BroadcastingSystems, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,38 the Court
rejected the notion that the first amendment afforded a private right of access to the broadcast media. In FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild,3 9 the Court
held that disappointed listeners did not have a first amendment right to prevent radio stations from abandoning arguably unique formats and adopting
ones that allegedly contributed nothing new to program diversity. Moreover, recently the Court has questioned the frequency "scarcity rationale"the rationale used to justify restricting broadcasters' first amendment
rights.4 ° Thus, even the Supreme Court is beginning to recognize that
broadcast frequencies are no longer as scarce as they once appeared and that
broadcasters' second class citizenship in this area must be reexamined.
In any event, cable television does not communicate through limited overthe-air frequencies, but rather through closed-circuit coaxial cables that have
dozens and sometimes hundreds of channels. A cable operator can often
double or triple its channel capacity if there is enough program supply and
subscriber demand to warrant it. Competitive cable operators can also be
authorized 4 1 if the incumbent does not respond to burgeoning consumer demand and program supply. In the unlikely event that utility poles and conduits have no space for additional cables, the poles can be replaced with
taller poles, and deeper trenches can be dug for supplemental conduits.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 390.
453 U.S. 367 (1981).
436 U.S. 775 (1978).
412 U.S. 94 (1973).

39. 450 U.S. 582 (1981).
40. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3116 n.ll (1984).

41. See Huntington TV Corp. v. New York Comm'n on Cable Television, 61 N.Y.2d 926,
463 N.E.2d 34 (1984).
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has no place in evaluating government regulation
"[T]he 'scarcity rationale'
42
television."
cable
of
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit struck down the FCC's must-carry rules,
which required cable operators to carry all local broadcast stations upon
request, as an impermissible infringement on the first amendment editorial
and journalistic rights of cable operators. The Quincy decision did not comment on the legality of mandating public access channels. 43 But its criticism
of the must-carry rules carries obvious relevance in the PEG access realm:
The [must-carry] rules coerce speech; they require the operator to
carry the signals of local broadcasters regardless of their content
and irrespective of whether the operator considers them appropriate programming for the community it serves. .

.

. [Clertain in-

jury stems from the substantial limitations the rules work on the
operator's otherwise broad discretion to select the programming it
offers its subscribers."
The appellate court further observed "that the rules force operators to act as
a mouthpiece for ideological perspectives they do not share."4 5
Just as the District of Columbia Circuit in Quincy rejected broadcast frequency scarcity as a means for legitimizing the must-carry rules, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Preferred Communications
v. City of Los Angeles, concluded that economic scarcity did not justify Los
Angeles' decision to auction off the right to offer cable television service.4 6
The Ninth Circuit relied on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,47
which held that the Herald's economic power did not justify forcing that
newspaper to contribute space to political candidates.
On these authorities, it is extremely doubtful that broad cable channel
access requirements are constitutional.4 8 It is conceivable that some court
may be asked to legitimize the mandatory setting aside of PEG channels on
the ground that the presence of one cable operator on the poles has increased
prohibitively the pole attachment costs for the government or any public or
educational group which otherwise might have offered cable service. The
argument would be that the cable operator's actions have raised to an insur42. Quincy Cable TV Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1449; accord Preferred Communications, Inc.
v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 380 (1985).

43. 768 F.2d at 1452 n.39.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 754 F.2d at 1404-05.
47. 418 U.S. 241, 249-58 (1974).

48. But see Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated, No.
83-1800 (1st Cir. 1985).
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mountable level the independent entry costs for PEG cable systems, thus
making access to the cable operator's system "essential" for the PEG
programmer. Yet, even accepting arguendo such a peculiar extension of antitrust law's "essential facility" doctrine 49 to justify a first amendment right
of access to the cable operator's transmission system, there would be no basis
for extending the concept further to justify franchise fee and PEG support
requirements. The cable operator's presence on the poles and on the underground conduits has not increased the cost of constructing municipal cable
access studios or the cost of producing PEG programming, irrespective of
whether that presence constitutes a practical economic barrier to the construction of a second cable transmission system. In short, no amalgamation
of Red Lion's public-is-paramount concept with the "essential facility" doctrine should warrant a city to require the cable operator to finance construction of city-controlled studios, to furnish cameras and other production
equipment, to train personnel, or to provide free installation and monthly
program service to schools and public service organizations. Instead the rule
of Murdock prevails. As gatekeeper to the public rights-of-way, the municipality may charge a license fee limited to the legitimate costs of regulation.
The municipality may not charge for the exercise of first amendment privileges a fee that is designed to raise money for other municipal services.
To defend the constitutionality of mandatory access support payments,
some municipalities have alleged that the cable operator actually benefits
from those payments. In their view the programs financed through cable
operator payments attract customers who otherwise might not be cable subscribers. Whether such could be proven through scientifically sound surveys
is problematic. It is one thing for a subscriber to say he views city council
meetings regularly on the government access channel. It is quite another
thing for the subscriber to say truthfully that he would never have subscribed to cable if council meetings had been carried only as brief news items
on the retransmitted local broadcast stations or on local news cablecasts
under the cable operator's editorial control. Obviously, price and programming variety are key variables in subscribers' minds. Lower or no access
support payments would permit an operator to reduce prices, create or expand its own local news and public affairs programming, or acquire other
commercial programming. The lowered prices or the additional cable operator-controlled programming might well attract far more viewers than those
who subscribe to cable only for its PEG programming.
Even if the cable operator "benefits" from forced PEG payments (or re49. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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quired franchise fees dedicated to PEG purposes), that should not legitimize
direct government interference into the cable operator's determination of
how to finance his first amendment enterprise. No doubt a controversial
mayor's "op-ed" column or letters to the editor could generate newspaper
purchases. But surely it violates the first amendment to force a newspaper
publisher not only to print the mayor's messages but to pay the mayor's
ghostwriter. The FCC's control over the allocation of broadcast frequencies
to particular geographic locations clearly benefits broadcasters by preventing
interference and thereby permitting broadcasters to communicate effectively.
Bestowal of such a government benefit on a private first amendment speaker
might well entitle the government to reimbursement of its regulatory expenses. But one could not seriously suggest that this undeniable benefit
would permit Uncle Sam to force broadcasters to finance government-owned
studios and programs. Like the "diversity" rationale, the "benefit" rationale
(even if factually provable) does not make cable access support payments
something that cities can impose on cable operators as a precondition to the
exercise of first amendment privileges.
The sole remaining municipal rationale for franchise fees is regulatory
cost reimbursement. In Murdock, the Supreme Court was careful to differentiate the license tax from a legitimate "nominal" fee "imposed as a regulatory measure and calculated to defray the expense of protecting those on the
streets and at home against the abuses of solicitors." 5 The Court distinguished Cox v. New Hampshire,5 which had upheld the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses for parading on the public streets without a permit. The
Cox opinion held that the state statute relied upon by the City of Manchester
was a permissible, nondiscriminatory "time, place, and manner" regulation
and that its license fee was consistent with the first amendment. The New
Hampshire fee, which could be adjusted up to a maximum of $300 by local
authorities according to the expected size and length of the parade, was "not
a revenue tax, but one to meet the expense incident to the administration of
the [parade licensing] Act and to the maintenance of public order in the
'52
matter licensed."
Since Cox and Murdock, courts have closely scrutinized governmental
claims that license fees imposed on first amendment activities are essential
for regulatory cost reimbursement. In Fernandes v. Limmer,13 the DallasFort Worth airport authority failed to offer any support for its contention
that a $6.00 daily fee was needed to regulate the granting of each permit to
50. 319 U.S. at 116.
51. 312 U.S. 569 (1940).
52. Id. at 576 (quoting State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 142, 16 A.2d 508, 513 (1940)).

53. 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981).
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distribute literature and solicit funds within the airport terminal. At the
request of adherents to the Krishna religion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit struck down the fee provision. The Fernandes
court found the burden to be on the municipality to "demonstrate a link
between the fee and the costs of the licensing process." 5 4 It concluded that a
fee for defraying administrative costs "is permissible

. .

.

only to the extent

that the fees are necessary" and the uses of the fee are restricted to "covering
the costs of regulation."" Several other rulings demonstrate the demanding
scrutiny that municipalities must satisfy in order for their license fees to
survive a first amendment challenge.
In Baldwin v. Redwood City,56 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a California
city's sign inspection and removal fees because they did not "fairly reflect
costs incurred by the city in connection with such activity." 5 7 In defense of
the $1.00 inspection fee, the city offered evidence that the average inspection
cost was $10.00; and in support of the $5.00 removal "deposit," the city
asserted an average removal cost of $25.00. But averaged cost data was unacceptable to the court. The Baldwin court held that the charges were "disproportionately burdensome" and therefore invalid because the city's
administrative costs varied widely depending on the size and number of temporary signs and because of "[t]he absence of apportionment" or other appropriate tailoring of fees to costs.58
In Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carlson,5 9 Jacksonville, Florida, estimated
its annual personnel and equipment costs to license adult entertainment
businesses at several hundred thousand dollars, in order to justify annual
license fees of a thousand dollars or more per most adult establishments.
The court enjoined the license fee system because "none of the witnesses was
able to tie his particular projections to specific administrative requirements
Similarly, in Wendling v.
in anything other than a speculative manner.'
City of Duluth,6 the $500 adult bookstore license fee was struck down because the funds received by the city were used not only to administer the
licensing scheme but also to enforce a separate obscenity ordinance. There
have been parallel rulings in other jurisdictions.62
54. Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 633 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S.
1124 (1982).
55. Id. at 633.
56. 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977).
57. Id. at 1372.
58. Id. at 1371-72.
59. 450 F. Supp. 696, 705 (M.D. Fla. 1978).

60. Id. at 705.
61. 495 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Minn. 1980).
62. Id. at 1385. For similar rulings, see, e.g., Hull v. Petrillo, 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir.
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When the FCC promulgated a regulation governing cable TV franchise
fees, it simply presumed that a three-percent fee was justifiable. 63 The FCC
inquired into regulatory costs only when a city sought fees over three percent of gross revenue.' On application for waiver the agency allowed up to
five percent, but only if the city could demonstrate that it needed the funds
for cable television-related activities. 65 The FCC did not, however, require
that those funds be used strictly for regulation of the cable operator. 66 Instead the agency permitted the fees to be used for support of PEG programming and facilities.67 Also, the FCC usually was satisfied by projections of
the first three years' cable revenues and city costs. 68 The Commission typically added a general admonition that any imbalance between fees and costs
should be rectified over the term of the franchise.69
The first amendment cases impose a much more rigorous standard than
does the FCC. PEG support is not a cost of "regulating" the cable operation; rather, it is the municipality's cost in producing or assisting in the production of programming. The "regulatory cost" rationale, therefore, cannot
help justify PEG support requirements as permissible under first amendment
precedent. The first amendment authorities also impose a stringent burden
of proof on the cities to link the size of the fee to the true regulatory costs.
Constitutional precedent requires a reasoned prediction not only for the first
three years, when the bulk of regulatory expenses occur, but for the entire
term. 70
Ordinarily a city charges an application fee for any operator who files a
formal response to the city's request for proposal (RFP). If the city can
demonstrate a reasonably close dollars-and-cents correlation between the fee
1971) (reversing dismissal of Black Panther challenge to $15 annual newspaper street vendor
fee); Moffett v. Killian, 360 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1973) (invalidating lobbying registration
fee that exceeded administrative costs); NAACP v. City of Chester, 253 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Pa.
1966) (invalidating $25 sound truck license fee because city did not submit evidence justifying
permit fee on basis of administrative costs).
63. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1985).

64. Id.
65. In re City of Miami, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 458 (1984) ($200,000 annually for city
drug enforcement efforts disallowed by FCC).
66. Id. at 462-63 (access support payments permitted as franchise fees, but only up to 5%

limit for all franchise fees).
67. Id.
68. Cable Television Franchise Fee Compliance, FCC Pub. Notice No. 2858 (Mar. 5,
1984).
69. In re City of Miami, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 462; see also Letter from Roy J.
Stewart, Chief, Video Services Division, Mass Media Bureau, FCC, to Robert H. Ruxin (Aug.

17, 1984), available at the FCC File Reference Room, Ref. No. 4620-PP.
70. See supra notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
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and the cost of processing the application, the fee should survive constitutional challenge.
Municipalities also typically require the successful bidder to pay all of the
municipality's franchising costs, net of whatever application fees were previously collected. This is a much more questionable requirement. Many of a
city's so-called "franchising" costs are attributable to the costs of processing
other bidders' applications or of drafting regulatory provisions of obvious
illegality. Why should the successful bidder pay part of the costs of processing and rejecting other applications? To be sure, there is an economic benefit
to the franchise winner in not having to compete head-to-head for pole space
and cable subscribers.7" But there is also a benefit to each applicant in having its application thoroughly considered. The successful cable applicant
should no more have to subsidize the thorough consideration of its rivals'
applications than the political poster permittee in Baldwin v. Redwood City72
should have had to subsidize the cost of inspecting and removing other persons' signs. Furthermore, if the city has used outside consultants and its
own lawyers to draft illegal ordinance provisions (including overreaching
franchise fee and PEG support requirements), the successful bidder should
not have to pay those consultants' and lawyers' fees. Many RFP's and cable
ordinances contain elaborate language relating to matters that had been preempted by the FCC. There is no constitutional basis for having the successful bidder finance the research and drafting of such obviously illegal
provisions.
Many municipalities require a permit for each "street cut" undertaken by
a utility or other entity which needs to dig a hole or trench in the public
streets. A fee is charged for each permit. If a municipality requires the cable
operator to pay for street-cut permits in addition to the franchise fee, then
obviously the regulatory costs incident to administering the street-cut permit
program, as well as any additional public safety costs the street-cut permit
fee is to cover, cannot be used to justify the franchise fee. In many communities, the entity making the street cuts must itself restore the street to its
original condition. If the cable operator does that, then the restoration costs
cannot be used to justify the franchise fee. Typically, municipalities do not
inspect cable television construction for compliance with electrical safety
codes; that job is handled by the cable operator, the utilities that share the
poles and conduits with the cable operator, or the state public utility commission. If the city does inspect cable construction and maintenance, the
71. Even this benefit could prove illusory in light of the typical franchise's express
nonexclusivity.
72. 540 F.2d at 1371-72.
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inspection cost may be used to justify the equivalent amount of the franchise
fee. But care should be taken to exclude right-of-way inspections done for
the city's own purposes, such as determining where or how to place street
lamp and traffic light lines and water and sewer facilities. Typically, once a
cable system is built, there is little occasion for municipal officials to expend
resources policing the public safety aspects of the cable system. The occasional cracked or broken coaxial cable may impair television viewing but it
does not endanger public safety in the manner of a downed electrical line or
a leaking gas main.
If city police, planning, or engineering resources are expended during
cable construction to supervise traffic diversion and are not otherwise reimbursed by the cable operator, such expenses can be used to justify an
equivalent franchise fee. But the city may not use cable's arrival on the
scene as the vehicle for subsidizing the salaries of city employees who rarely
spend any significant amount of time on cable television matters over the life
of the franchise.73 Similarly, where supervening law eliminates a franchisemandated task, e.g., basic cable rate regulation after 1986," 4 the municipality
must factor that reduced regulatory role into its projection of franchise feereimbursable costs. Where the city does have an active regulatory role, e.g.,
investigating and resolving subscriber complaints, those costs should be
chargeable to franchise fees. But if the city merely bucks complaints to the
cable operator for resolution and rarely follows up, the city should not use
that minimal involvement to justify any significant portion of the required
franchise fees.
VI.

EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATED

Municipalities, as instruments of state action, are subject to the equal protection strictures of the fourteenth amendment.7 5 Where municipalities single out all or some speakers for special regulation, that differential treatment
is also subject to a special form of equal protection scrutiny required by the
first amendment, as applied under the fourteenth amendment's due process
73. See Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696, 705 (M.D. Fla. 1978)
(court rejects as unreasonable personnel and office equipment projections for administering
adult entertainment licensing ordinance).
74. See § 623 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2788 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543). In re Amendment of Parts 1, 63, 76 of the Commission's Rules To Implement the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
MM Doc. No. 84-1296 (FCC 85-179), 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637 (May 2,1985), 58 RAD. REG. 2d (P
& F) 1 (1985), appealdocketed sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, No. 85-1666
(D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 16, 1985).
75. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (first amendment applies to municipalities through the fourteenth amendment).
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clause. Cable television franchise fees in excess of legitimate regulatory costs
and all forms of mandatory PEG support contributions fail both equal protection tests.
Grosjean v. American Press Co.7 6 fathered the concept that equal protection of the media is embedded in the first amendment. Louisiana imposed a
special license tax of two percent of gross receipts upon any advertisingsupported publication having a circulation of more than twenty thousand
copies per week. Due to the circulation minimum, the tax applied to 13
daily newspapers but effectively exempted 4 other dailies and 120 weeklies.
The Supreme Court struck down the statute as an abridgment of freedom of
the press in contravention of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.77 It did not reach the thirteen daily papers' additional claim that the
statute violated the equal protection clause of that same amendment. 78 The
Court reviewed the Stamp Act and similar "obnoxious" English taxes which
preceded the Colonies' independence, and concluded that the first amendment was intended to prohibit not only prior censorship of content but also
taxes that single out publications and advertisements for special treatment.
Louisiana's tax was not one of "the ordinary forms of taxation for support of
79
the government . . . but one single in kind."
Part of the Grosjean opinion indicates that its principles apply if the "effect" of the differential tax is to curtail circulation. For example, the Court
said "the First Amendment

. .

.was meant to preclude

. .

any form of

previous restraint upon printed publications, or their circulation, including
that. . . effected by these two well-known and odious methods [i.e., newspaper and advertisement taxes]." 8 Yet, elsewhere the Court implied that legislative intent was determinative when it called Louisiana's action "a
deliberateand calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation
of information," 8 which had "the plain purpose of penalizing the publishers
and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of newspapers. ,82
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,83 the Supreme Court made clear that differential taxation of the press
violates the first amendment even when there is "no indication, apart from
the structure of the tax itself, of any impermissible or censorial motive on the
76. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
77. Id. at 251.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 250.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
Id. at 251 (emphasis added).
460 U.S. 575 (1983).
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part of the legislature." 8 4 Minneapolis Star struck down Minnesota's imposition of a "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products (excluding the
first $100,000) consumed in the production of a publication. The Court
noted that the statute was "facially discriminatory, singling out publications
for treatment that is, to our knowledge, unique in Minnesota tax law." 85
Unlike Minnesota's general use tax, which applied only to out-of-state
purchases avoiding Minnesota's sales tax, the ink and paper use tax applied
even if those items were purchased in the state.8 6 The ink and paper tax also
applied to components of the ultimate product (newspapers), whereas Minnesota ordinarily taxed only the retail sale or use of the ultimate product.8 7
The challenged use tax was different in a third respect: it targeted only a
limited group of large newspapers (those whose cost for ink and paper exceeded $100,000) and exempted all smaller newspapers.8 8 General Minnesota tax law, by contrast, had no small enterprise exemption.8 9
The Court in Minneapolis Star was guided by two basic principles: first,
"[A] tax that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications
within the press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify its action";9"
and second, to satisfy that burden, the government must evidence "a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation." 9 Minnesota's main interest was that it needed the
money. But the Court rejected this revenue-raising rationale because "an
alternative means of achieving the same interest without raising concerns
under the First Amendment [was] clearly available: the State could raise the
revenue by taxing businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit
in a tax that singles out the press." 92 The state responded that the tax "actually favors the press over other businesses."9 3 The Court rejected this invitation to fashion a rule to permit "singl[ing] out the press for a different
method of taxation" if the economic burden could be shown to be different
from or lighter than that on other businesses.94 The Court reasoned first
that "the very selection of the press for special treatment threatens

. . .

the

95
possibility of subsequently differentially more burdensome treatment."

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 580; see also id. at 592.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 592-93.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Second, it found that courts are "poorly equipped to evaluate with precision
the relative burdens of various methods of taxation.",9 6 The first amendment
forbids a court from taking the risk that its economic calculations of comparative tax burdens may be erroneous.9 7
The Minneapolis Star rationale was recently applied to microwave-delivered subscription television in City of Alameda v. PremierCommunications
Network, Inc.9 8 Alameda's municipal code imposed a business license tax of
three percent of gross receipts upon "[e]very person conducting a television
subscription service business" or "providing emergency communications
systems or alarms."9 9 A company transmitting HBO programming by over-

the-air microwave signal from a transmitter in Berkeley to customers' leased
antennas in Alameda refused to pay the tax. The state court of appeals
found the ordinance to be unconstitutional as applied to the particular subscription television operator and did not reach the question of its application
to emergency communications services. oo The court rested its decision on
the fact that, with the exception of emergency communications services, television subscription services were "taxed differently from any other business
in the City."' 0 '
Most Alameda businesses were subject to annual license taxes based on
"flat fees, 'per unit' fees, [or] flat fees plus sums based upon the number of
employees," and only a handful of businesses' fees were tied to gross receipts.1" 2 All but six categories of such businesses also were eligible to elect
"inlieu" fees based on gross receipts; the maximum "inlieu" rate, however,
was "less than one thirteenth of [the] 3 percent rate" required of subscription television.103 Five of the remaining six business categories ineligible to
elect "in lieu" fees-amusement parks and exhibitions, dance halls, and
handbill distributors, among others-were protected by comparatively low
dollar ceilings, the highest being $600. The sixth category, building and hotel leasing, paid a modest $4.00 per room annually. Only two businesses,
drive-in theaters and outdoor advertising, were taxed in a similar manner as
subscription television, in that their license fees were tied to gross receipts
and no "in lieu" option was available. Yet, their tax rates were substantially
lower than the rate for subscription television. With annual gross receipts of
96.
97.
98.
(1984).
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 589.
Id. at 591 n.14.
156 Cal. App. 3d 148, 202 Cal. Rptr. 684 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 567
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

151, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
154, 155 n.5, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 688 n.5.
155, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
155, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
155-56, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89.
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$210,000, the subscription television business would pay a tax of $6,300,
whereas the outdoor advertiser would pay $1,650 and the drive-in theater
would pay $472.50.104

Finding that subscription television is "a disseminator of protected
speech" under MinneapolisStar principles, the court in City ofAlameda considered whether the differentially heavier tax burden imposed upon subscription television was "necessary to achieve an overriding governmental
interest."' 5 The court agreed with the city that revenue generation is a
critical governmental interest, but it held that such an interest "cannot,
standing alone, justify special treatment of a segment of the media. . . when
alternative means of achieving the same interest without implicating First
Amendment concerns are available."' 6 The city could have achieved its
revenue objective simply "by imposing a generally applicable tax on
businesses."' 07
The court in City of Alameda recognized that "the rationale of its opinion
would apply to any television subscription service business engaged in dissemination of speech protected by the First Amendment," but it did not
attempt to identify all such businesses." 8 The particular ordinance included
cable television within the definition of "[t]elevision subscription service"
and permitted the imposition of a license tax or franchise fee upon the
franchised cable operator(s) up to "the maximum allowed under state or
federal law not in excess of [three percent]."' 0 9 Yet, the court skirted the
issue, saying instead "that the propriety of franchise fees which the City
' 0
requires of cable television businesses is in no way involved in this case." 1
There should be little question that the rationale of City ofAlameda, Minneapolis Star, and Grosjean applies to cable television franchise fees and PEG
support payments. Like the newspapers in Minneapolis Star and Grosjean
104. Id. at 156 n.6, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 689 n.6.
105. Id. at 156, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 689.

106. Id., 202 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
107. Id. at 157, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 689. The city also attempted to defend the unavailability
to subscription television businesses of the lower "in lieu" gross receipts tax schedule on the
ground that such businesses did not pay taxes and provide employment in the city. Without
determining whether that was so with respect to the particular subscription television company
defendant, the court rejected the purported justification on the ground that most of the other

businesses which also were denied the benefit of the "in lieu" schedule clearly did pay taxes
and provide employment in Alameda. Id., 202 Cal. Rptr. at 689. In short, the city's post hoc
justification could not have been the intended basis of the differential treatment. The court
also rejected as irrelevant the city's contention that the differential taxing of subscription television was not "intended to censor speech." Id. at 158 n.7, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 689 n.7.
108. Id. at 157 n.8, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 690 n.8.
109. ALAMEDA MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 13-11l(s), 13-1951(c), reprinted in City of Alameda,
156 Cal. App. 3d at 151 n.1, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 685 n.1.
110. City of Alameda, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 157 n.9, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 690 n.9.
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and the microwave-distributed pay TV service in City ofAlameda, cable television is a first amendment speaker/publisher. And like the media in those
cases, cable television has been singled out from other communications media and community businesses and has been subjected to a differentially
heavier tax in the form of franchise fees and PEG payments. Cities attempt
to defend this apparent inequity on the ground that cable television uses the
public rights of way in a more extensive and burdensome way than other
businesses. Assuming arguendo that cable television does use the public
rights-of-way in a manner different from other businesses, that fact alone
would not justify the differentially heavier financial burden imposed by a
municipality on cable television. Minimally, the municipality should have to
show that its tax and license schemes for other community businesses are
calibrated according to those other businesses' relative uses of the rights-ofway. Most, if not all, cities would fail that test.
A.

Comparison to Utilities

Typically, natural gas, electric, steam heat, and telephone utilities run
their lines along public rights-of-way and pay cities little or nothing for that
usage. '" Utility lines have been a permanent fixture of the municipal scene,
in contrast to cable television lines, which are a comparatively recent phenomenon. Moreover, utility lines along a particular route typically consume
far more underground or aerial space in the aggregate than do cable television lines. Because they are inherently more dangerous than cable television
wires, individual electricity lines and steam and gas mains require much
more space between them and other lines than does cable TV wire. In most
urban areas, streets are frequently dug up or manholes opened for repair or
installation of utility lines. In contrast, once cable TV trunk and feeder lines
have been put in place, either underground or on poles, there is little likelihood of repair disrupting vehicular or pedestrian traffic during the remainder of the typical fifteen-year franchise term. Furthermore, many
municipalities charge cable construction firms, or the franchised operators,
street-cutting fees that are designed to compensate the government for regulatory work in connection with the street cuts. Such street-cutting fees are
also required of utilities. The typical municipal street-cut permit file shows
vastly more permits granted to utilities than to the cable operator, reflecting
the far greater and more continuous disruption of public ways caused by
utilities.
111. Telephone companies even install booths on public sidewalks, but are not generally
required to give the city free telephone service or equipment or a share of the companies'
revenues.
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In short, a defender of cable TV franchise fees will have difficulty showing
that utilities actually pay cities for the use of public rights-of-way, much less
that what they pay is tied proportionately to the physical extent to which
they burden those rights-of-way. Two debatable propositions-that utility
services may be more of a "necessity" than cable television and that utilities
may have a "duty" to serve everyone whereas the cable television operator
does not-have no bearing on this analysis. Either differential payment
schemes are tied to differential degrees of burdening public rights-of-way, or
they are not so tied. Other differences between the utility and cable TV businesses cannot justify subjecting the first amendment electronic speaker/publisher to the heavier payment obligation.
B.

Comparison to Advertising Signs and Other Uses

In an indeterminate number of urban cable TV communities, business establishments are free to extend signs out from their buildings over the dedicated public sidewalks. Rarely is there any fee for this use of the aerial
public rights-of-way. Yet, these signs are at least as "permanent" as overhead coaxial cable. Further, they are certainly no more aesthetically pleasing, and, if improperly installed or maintained, they are potentially much
more dangerous to passers-by. Some communities also allow rolling signs
and vending carts on public sidewalks, but rarely do such communities tie
any permit fees to the extent of physical usage or actual disruption of the
public passageways. The same tends to be true when streets and sidewalks
are closed off for parades, festivals, block parties, and building construction
or renovation.
Advertising increasingly is finding its way onto bench backs, transit stop
shelter walls, and the sides of refuse cans along public sidewalks. In some
instances, the entity owning the advertising facility does pay the city a percentage of gross receipts. In other cases, the entity may furnish the benches,
shelters or cans as a public service. Whatever the situation, it is unlikely that
the city has calculated its "compensation" according to the extent of physical space used, the amount of net pedestrian convenience/inconvenience created, or the permanent/portable nature of the bench/shelter/can involved.
Absolute precision cannot be expected. However, if the municipality has
made no effort whatsoever to tie its compensation to the particular use of the
rights-of-way, then the absence of such a tie makes unpersuasive any attempted justification of franchise fee/PEG support obligations based on
cable's burdening the public rights-of-way. Installed cable rarely interferes
with anyone's use of the rights-of-way. On the other hand, an advertisers'
benches, shelters, and trash cans unquestionably require pedestrians to walk
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around them, and they are commonly damaged by vandals and wayward
automobiles, thus necessitating frequent scrutiny by police and public safety
engineers.
Taxicabs, buses, ambulances, courier services, refuse vehicles, hearses, and
delivery vans, carrying everything from raw produce to sophisticated satellite dishes and television paraphernalia, ply the public ways, sometimes
blocking streets or curb lanes or sidewalks. Taxicabs and buses may carry
inside or outside advertising as well as passengers. Television and radio stations depend upon the public thoroughfares for supplies and employees to
reach them. Their electronic news-gathering vans with sophisticated cameras and microwave-relay antennas can often be seen on public streets and
walkways; and certainly, the news media's reporters depend upon unhindered access to public buildings and officials. Movie theaters and concert
halls create major human and vehicular congestion and promote occasional
littering problems along the sidewalks and street lanes outside their establishments. Even video cassette rental shops fronting on main thoroughfares
are prone to burden the flow of traffic at key hours of the day or evening.
Yet, none of these users of the public rights-of-way-including many that
compete directly or indirectly with cable television for customers or advertising dollars-pays municipal fees calculated according to the extent to which
its business burdens or benefits from those rights-of-way. None is obliged to
furnish free service or equipment to the city.
C. Comparison to Newspapers
Like cable television, the newspaper business has always depended for its
existence upon extensive use of the public rights-of-way. The earliest Tom
Paine "newspapers" were one-sheet circulars or pamphlets passed around on
public streets and door-to-door. As printing technology developed and literacy spread, newsboys hawked their papers on street comers and delivered
periodicals over public sidewalks to private dwellings and businesses. Also,
printed matter began to be delivered by mail over public rights-of-way. Today, newspaper delivery vehicles drive the public streets, often temporarily
blocking or diverting traffic at pickup and dropoff points. Some periodicals
are even delivered to television sets and computer screens by cable television
or other wire facilities running through the public ways. Newspaper vending machines, unheard of in Tom Paine's day, are placed on public sidewalks
and chained to benches, traffic meters, or light poles.
Despite their extensive use of the public rights of way, newspaper publishers are not typically subject to anything remotely comparable to the
franchise fee and PEG support obligations imposed on cable television. This
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radically different treatment of two users of the public ways cannot be justified on the basis of any compelling governmental interest and, therefore, it is
a violation of free speech and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. Before considering possible municipal arguments to justify this blatantly unequal treatment, it may be helpful to review some of the
constitutional precedents that protect the print media.
In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 2 the Supreme Court held an ordinance requiring persons to obtain written permission of the city manager before "dis' 3
to be void on its face. The city
tributing . . . literature of any kind"11
accurately reasoned "that every municipality is faced with a sanitary problem in removing from its streets, papers, circulars and other like materials." 1' 14 Yet, the ordinance was fatally flawed because it prohibited
distribution "at any time, at any place, and in any manner without a permit"
and was not tailored to address any legitimate municipal concern such as
"littering of the streets."' '15 In words that ring just as true in the cable television context today as they did in City of Griffin's print media context, the
Court said: "The ordinance cannot be saved because it relates to distribution and not to publication. 'Liberty of circulating is as essential to that
freedom as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.' ,,116 In Jamison v. Texas,117 the Court invalidated a Dallas ordinance that prohibited handbill distribution. The Court
had no quarrel with the proposition that "states [and their municipal instrumentalities] may provide for control of travel on their streets in order to
insure the safety and convenience of the traveling public."" ' 8 Nonetheless,
"[the right to distribute [literature] . . . on the streets may not be prohibited at all times, at all places, and under all circumstances."' '" The Court
held that
one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left open to the
public carries with him there as elsewhere the constitutional right
to express his views in an orderly fashion. This right extends to the
communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by
the spoken word.120
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

303 U.S. 444 (1938).
Id. at 447.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 452 (citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877)).
318 U.S. 413 (1943).

118. Id. at 416.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Prior to Schneider v. State, 121 lower courts had sustained convictions
under the antipamphleteering ordinances of Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and
Worcester, Massachusetts, on the ground that distribution of literature "encouraged or resulted in" littering by the intended recipients of the literature.' 22 The Supreme Court overturned the convictions, reasoning that:
Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution
results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech
and press. This constitutional protection does not deprive a city of
all power to prevent street littering. There are obvious methods of
punishment of those
preventing littering. Amongst these is the
123
who actually throw papers on the streets.
The Court also rejected the suggestion that the ordinances were valid because persons were free to distribute printed matter in public places other
than streets and alleys. The Court said, "[T]he streets are natural and
proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is
not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate' 24places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." ,
The print media's right to distribute door-to-door, a distribution that
cable television accomplishes through salesmen's visits followed by installation of "drop" cables, has been repeatedly affirmed by the courts. In Martin
v. City of Struthers,125 the Supreme Court stated: "Freedom to distribute
information to every citizen whenever he desires to receive it is so clearly
vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable police
and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully
preserved."' 126 Believing that the individual householder could decide
whether or not to deal with the solicitor/distributor, 2 7 the City of Struthers
Court overturned the city's absolute ban on door-to-door distribution of
literature. Eight years later in Breard v. Alexandria,128 however, the Court
upheld the conviction of door-to-door magazine solicitors under an Alexandria, Louisiana, ordinance that forbade solicition by persons " 'not having
been requested or invited so to do by the owner or owners.' ,129 The Court,
of course, did not question the print media's first amendment right to dis121. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
122. Id. at 162.
123. Id.

124. Id. at 163.
125. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
126. Id. at 146-47.

127. Id. at 147-49.
128. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
129. Id. at 624 (quoting the Alexandria, Louisiana, ordinance).
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tribute requested literature door-to-door; its focus was limited to the solicitation of subscriptions, which the Court said "may be made by anyone
interested in receiving the magazines without the annoyances of house-tohouse canvassing." 1 3 Breard attempted to distinguish City of Struthers as
having involved free religious solicitation with "no element of the commercial.""'3 Breard's "commercial" distinction has fallen out of favor in more
recent precedent.' 3 2 The basic thrust of City of Struthers, therefore, is still
33
good law today.'
Following the Supreme Court's lead, the lower courts have spelled out in
some detail the broad extent of the print media's protection against municipal interference with the means and methods of distribution. In Strasser v.
Doorley,1 34 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found
''no governmental interest of any importance" in holding that Providence,
Rhode Island's requirement that newsboys register with the city and pay
fifty cents for a numbered identification badge was unconstitutional.1 35
In Miller Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Keene, 136 the United States District
Court for the District of New Hampshire enjoined the city's summary removal of the BrattleboroReformer's newsracks, which had been attached to
parking meters on public sidewalks. The city asserted that the newsracks
"might" impede pedestrian traffic or interfere with utilization of the meters. 137 The Court accepted the municipality's right to "impose reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions" on newspaper vending machines. 3
There was no evidence, however, of poorly maintained or damaged newsboxes endangering pedestrians or automobiles, and there was substantial evidence that the city itself attached trash cans and ticket collection boxes to
1 39
parking meters.
In a parallel decision, Southern New Jersey Newspapers, Inc. v. State of
130. Id. at 644.
131. Id. at 643.
132. "To the extent that any of the Court's past decisions [such as Breard] ... indicate
that commercial speech is excluded from First Amendment protections, those decisions, to
that extent, are no longer good law." Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632 n.7 (1980).
133. Cf Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2274-75 (1985) (commercial speech entitled to first amendment protection somewhat less extensive than noncommercial speech).
134. 432 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1970).

135. Id. at 569; accord Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826, 834-35 (1st Cir. 1972).
136.

546 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.H. 1982).

137. Id. at 835 n.l.
138. Id. at 834.
139. Id. at 835 n.l.
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New Jersey," the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey enjoined the state's removal of newspaper vending machines from
street curbs and sidewalks along state highway routes as an impermissible
first amendment infringement. The court was unimpressed by the argument
that the ban was limited to state-maintained routes, holding instead "that
the existence of alternative categories of public streets is not sufficient by
itself to justify a total prohibition on one category of public roads."' 4 1 The
state's concern about "possible safety hazards" was "speculative" and was
based on a few photographs of newsboxes that had unshoveled snow around
them or that partially obstructed access to utility poles.142 Contrary evidence and photographs showed that the newsboxes caused no obstruction,
did not contribute to pedestrian or motor vehicle accidents, incurred minimal vandalism, and spurred no complaints.' 4 3 Similarly, most cable television companies could show that their facilities, once installed, posed no more
health or safety danger than did the newsboxes. The state's aesthetic argument in the Southern New Jersey case was unpersuasive because the boxes
were in areas already blighted by houses, stores, utility poles, billboards,
traffic signs, benches, fire hydrants, mail boxes, and street signs. 1" The
same, of course, is true today for most cable television facilities, which are
placed on poles and in conduits that already hold unsightly telephone, electric, and other utility lines.
An ordinance totally banning newspaper vending machines from public
sidewalks was declared unconstitutional as applied in PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Borough Council.145 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania rejected the Borough of Swarthmore's contention that the ordinance was valid because newspapers could still be sold
on private property, either by home delivery, in stores, or at the train station. 146 The court was also unimpressed by the Borough's "hypothesized"
public safety concerns as purported justifications for a total ban. 147 On the
other hand, carefully tailored regulations as to size, location, appearance,
and nonremovability, the court said, might survive constitutional
scrutiny. 148
Other court opinions have adopted similar reasoning in invalidating news140. 542 F. Supp. 173 (D.N.J. 1982).

141. Id. at 184 n.21.
142. Id. at 178, 186.

143. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.at 186-87.
381 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Id. at 242 n.8.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 244.
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box prohibitions.' 4 9 It is also apparent that newspapers and other print media may not, consistent with the Constitution, be subjected to any
"deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation
of information."' 150 Nor may government directly tax a newspaper's mere
51
exercise of its constitutional right to publish or communicate knowledge.
Municipalities may, of course, require newspapers to reimburse the government for the reasonable costs of any constitutionally permissible time, place,
and manner regulation.' 52 Newspapers also may be subject to nondiscriminatory revenue-raising sales, business license, or income taxes.' 5 3 But revenue-raising taxes that single out the press for differential treatment generally
are not constitutional.' 5 4 Additionally, the first amendment prevents the
government from compelling newspapers to provide reply space, both because the associated cost may prevent the publication of other material and
5
because compelled access robs newspapers of their editorial discretion. '
D. Outlook for Challenges to Municipal Cable Franchise Payments
In Minneapolis Star, the Court held that government must demonstrate "a
counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve
without differential taxation" for such a taxation scheme to stand when applied to a first amendment medium.' 56 Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist argued
that the tax classifications should have been judged under more traditional
149. See, e.g., Kash Enterprises v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 3d 294, 562 P.2d 1302, 138

Cal. Rptr. 53 (1977) (required notice and hearing before removal of newsracks); Remer v. City
of El Cajon, 52 Cal. App. 3d 441, 125 Cal. Rptr. 116 (Ct. App. 1975) (ordinance overbroad on
its face); Gannett Co. v. City of Rochester, 69 Misc. 2d 619, 330 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. 1972)
(ordinance is impermissible prior restraint); see also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. City of
Hallandale, 734 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1984) (invalidated the regulation of newspaper vending
machines where the ordinance gave uncontrolled discretion to city officials and failed to guarantee procedural due process).
150. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 223, 250 (1936).
151. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112-16 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584
(1942), rev'd, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
152. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 116-17; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941);
Gannett Co. v. City of Rochester, 69 Misc. 2d at 629, 330 N.Y.S.2d at 659-60.
153. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586
& n.9 (1983); City of Corona v. Corona Daily Independent, 115 Cal. App. 2d 382, 252 P.2d 56
(Ct. App.) (business license tax upheld), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 833 (1953). But cf Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. City of Hallandale, 734 F.2d at 669-73 (district court found revenueraising occupational licensing tax unconstitutional as applied to newspaper vending machines;
appellate court reversed on ground that Tax Injunction Act withdrew federal court
jurisdiction).
154. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. at 59093.
155. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-58 (1974).
156. 460 U.S. at 585.
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equal protection analysis. If the tax scheme "significantly burden[ed]" first
amendment rights, he would have subjected the classifications to "strict
scrutiny. ' Apparently believing that the ink-and-paper use tax was not
particularly burdensome, Justice Rehnquist contended that the tax scheme
should be upheld because there was a "rational" explanation for the different
classifications. The majority, by contrast, "view[ed] the problem as one arising directly under the First Amendment" because "the Framers perceived
singling out the press for taxation as a means of abridging freedom of the
press." 15 Thus, rather than analyze the issues under the familiar tiers of
equal protection scrutiny, the Court held that the use tax could survive
"only if the governmental interest outweighs the burden [on the press] and
cannot be achieved by means that do not infringe First Amendment rights as
significantly." 159
Applying the majority view in Minneapolis Star to cable television, revenue-raising franchise fees and required PEG support payments quite obviously are unconstitutional. They "singl[e] out the press"' 60--in this case the
electronic press. Whatever level of importance is assigned to the government interests in raising general revenues and in financing PEG support,
those interests can always be achieved by a means that does not single out
cable television operators or infringe upon their first amendment rights.
Municipalities can simply "raise the [needed] revenue by taxing businesses
[or individuals] generally, [thereby] avoiding the censorial threat implicit in
a tax that singles out the press"' 61 (or here, cable television operators). As
noted, however, the majority opinion rested heavily on the Framers' intent
and actual experience with taxes on the print media. No doubt municipalities will argue that Minneapolis Star applies only to the printed press. Yet,
the first amendment has never been given such a narrow reading, tying it to
the technology of the eighteenth-century printing press.
In the event that MinneapolisStar is not extended to embrace cable television, however, then Justice Rehnquist's dissent suggests that the analysis
must follow the equal protection "tiers" approach. There is a line of equal
protection cases involving the "public forum" doctrine that would appear
relevant in this context. Under those authorities, if the disfavored medium
operates (or seeks to operate) in a public forum, the government must
demonstrate "compelling reasons" for favoring another class of entities over
157. Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 585 n.7.
159. Id.
160. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 586.
161. Id.
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If the disfavored entity operates in a nonpublic forum, however, the
discrimination "need only rationally further a legitimate state purpose." 163
Streets and parks are traditional public fora; other government property
"opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity," but which
the government is "not required to create [as a] . . . forum in the first
place," is also a public forum."M "Public property which is not by tradition
or designation a forum for public communication" falls into the nonpublic
forum category. 16 5 "[S]elective access [to such property] does not [automat16 6
ically] transform [it] into a public forum."
In Members of the City Council v. Taxpayersfor Vincent, 167 the Supreme
Court held that utility poles were not traditional or designated public
fora.' 68 Consequently, the city's total ban on the posting of signs on utility
poles could survive first amendment scrutiny if it was reasonably necessary
to accomplish a substantial, content-neutral municipal purpose. The Court
held that the sign ban was content-neutral and curtailed speech no more
than was minimally necessary to accomplish the city's traffic safety and aes169
thetic objectives.
Vincent has obvious ramifications for cable television operators who attach cables to utility poles. In PreferredCommunications, the Ninth Circuit
7
conceded that utility poles and conduits are not traditional public fora.1 1
Nonetheless, the court characterized those facilities as designated public fora
because state law dedicated surplus pole space to cable television and because utilities hold themselves out as providers of pole-attachment services
to cable companies. 7 ' The Ninth Circuit also distinguished Vincent on the
ground that cable television is "basically compatible" with the normal use of
utility poles whereas the signs in Vincent were not compatible.' 72 After Vincent and PreferredCommunications, three issues evolve regarding the applicability of the public forum doctrine to cable franchising: first, whether the
aggregate right-of-way-subsurface, surface, and aerial-is indeed a thoroughfare open to the public and various media of expression; second,
whether a single cable television operator's use of that right of way is com162. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).

163. Id.at 54.
164. Id.at 45.

165. Id. at 46.
166. Id. at 47.
167. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
168. Id.at 2134.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 2135.
754 F.2d 1396, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1409.
Id. at 1408.
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patible with legitimate use by utilities, other media of expression, or the pedestrian and vehicular public; and third, whether cable television is a
discrete medium of expression much the same as newspapers are. With respect to the last issue, it should be noted that cable television, unlike the
posted signs in Vincent, is "a uniquely valuable [and] important mode of
communication" 17 3 that cannot be banned from the public rights-of-way
upon which that mode of communication depends.
Although this Commentary will not pursue these issues, suffice it to say
that in Vincent the Court was uncomfortable with applying the "public fo174
rum" doctrine to a specific piece of "tangible property," i.e., utility poles.
Nor did the Court view sign-posting as a "discrete medium of expression." 1 75 Whatever the outcome of Preferred Communications so far as the
question of allowing access to a second cable operator, the incumbent cable
operator's right to be free from differentially burdensome taxation should be
unaffected. Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Transportation Authority 116 is not to the contrary. In Gannett, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit permitted the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (MTA) to charge revenue-raising license fees for
the placement of newspaper vending machines in train stations. The court
concluded, perhaps erroneously, that MTA's stations were neither traditional nor dedicated public fora. Because MTA operated the stations in a
proprietary rather than governmental capacity, the court held that it was
reasonable for MTA to charge for the use of its facilities.' 7 7 Cities, on the
other hand, do not normally operate streets and sidewalks and the area
above and beneath them in a proprietary way. Moreover, in Gannett, the
plaintiff had numerous places on the public rights-of-way to locate its newspaper vending machines. Placement in MTA stations was hardly essential
to the newspaper publisher's ability to distribute. Because of those options,
the Second Circuit was able to say "[tihe marketplace provides protection
against unreasonable licensing fees."'

78

The marketplace does not, however,

control cities' greed in raising cable television franchise fees and PEG support funds to unreasonable or discriminatory levels. The regulation of cable
television is distinguishable in several respects from the restriction of newspaper distribution in Gannett. First, cable television cannot operate at all
unless it has access to the public rights-of-way. Second, in Gannett, newspa173. 104 S. Ct. at 2133.
174.

104 S. Ct. at 2134 n.32.

175. Id.
176. 745 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984).

177. Id. at 774-75.
178. Id. at 775 n.4.
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the victims of discrimi-

nation."1 79

No other types of vendors were allowed into the MTA stations.
Contrast this with the usual municipal rights-of-way, which are extensively
used by all sorts of utility, business, and individual users who pay no
franchise fees or anything remotely similar to PEG support payments.
Third, despite the proprietary nature of MTA's control over its "nonpublic
forum," the Gannett opinion directed the lower court "to enter an order
prohibiting MTA from discriminating unreasonably in fees charged for licensing of newsracks."' 8 ° In sum, even in a nonpublic forum environment,
first amendment media are entitled to full protection against unreasonable
discrimination done in the name of municipal revenue-raising.
Most businesses and media make extensive use of public rights-of-way
without being required to pay franchise fees or any fees comparable to PEG
support payments. In light of this differential treatment and of the minimal
health, safety, or aesthetic burdens imposed by installed cable television facilities (as compared to burdens imposed by other nonpaying users), PEG
support requirements and franchise fees in excess of reasonable regulatory
costs violate the equal protection strictures of the first and fourteenth
amendments.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Despite the cable industry's long-time inertia on the subject and despite
the endorsement in the Cable Act, municipally imposed franchise fee and
access programming financial support requirements seem doomed to invalidation under the free speech, free press, and equal protection guarantees of
the Constitution. The forthcoming Supreme Court decision in Preferred
Communications is unlikely to change that result, although it doubtless will
affect some of the terminology and focus of the debate.

179. Id.at 774.
180. Id. at 776.

